Merge pull request #1143 from HackTricks-wiki/research_update_src_macos-hardening_macos-security-and-privilege-escalation_mac-os-architecture_macos-kernel-vulnerabilities_20250717_082721

Research Update Enhanced src/macos-hardening/macos-security-...

Author: carlospolop

src/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/macos-kernel-vulnerabilities.md

@@ -7,7 +7,94 @@
 [**In this report**](https://jhftss.github.io/The-Nightmare-of-Apple-OTA-Update/) are explained several vulnerabilities that allowed to compromised the kernel compromising the software updater.\
 [**PoC**](https://github.com/jhftss/POC/tree/main/CVE-2022-46722).
 
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+---
+
+## 2024: In-the-wild Kernel 0-days (CVE-2024-23225 & CVE-2024-23296)
+
+Apple patched two memory-corruption bugs that were actively exploited against iOS and macOS in March 2024 (fixed in macOS 14.4/13.6.5/12.7.4).
+
+* **CVE-2024-23225 – Kernel**  
+  • Out-of-bounds write in the XNU virtual-memory subsystem allows an unprivileged process to obtain arbitrary read/write in the kernel address space, bypassing PAC/KTRR.  
+  • Triggered from userspace via a crafted XPC message that overflows a buffer in `libxpc`, then pivots into the kernel when the message is parsed.  
+* **CVE-2024-23296 – RTKit**  
+  • Memory corruption in the Apple Silicon RTKit (real-time co-processor).  
+  • Exploitation chains observed used CVE-2024-23225 for kernel R/W and CVE-2024-23296 to escape the secure co-processor sandbox and disable PAC.
+
+Patch level detection:
+```bash
+sw_vers                 # ProductVersion 14.4 or later is patched
+authenticate sudo sysctl kern.osversion  # 23E214 or later for Sonoma
+```
+If upgrading is not possible, mitigate by disabling vulnerable services:
+```bash
+launchctl disable system/com.apple.analyticsd
+launchctl disable system/com.apple.rtcreportingd
+```
+
+---
+
+## 2023: MIG Type-Confusion – CVE-2023-41075
+
+`mach_msg()` requests sent to an unprivileged IOKit user client lead to a **type confusion** in the MIG generated glue-code. When the reply message is re-interpreted with a larger out-of-line descriptor than was originally allocated, an attacker can achieve a controlled **OOB write** into kernel heap zones and eventually
+escalate to `root`.
+
+Primitive outline (Sonoma 14.0-14.1, Ventura 13.5-13.6):
+```c
+// userspace stub
+typed_port_t p = get_user_client();
+uint8_t spray[0x4000] = {0x41};
+// heap-spray via IOSurfaceFastSetValue
+io_service_open_extended(...);
+// malformed MIG message triggers confusion
+mach_msg(&msg.header, MACH_SEND_MSG|MACH_RCV_MSG, ...);
+```
+Public exploits weaponise the bug by:
+1. Spraying `ipc_kmsg` buffers with active port pointers.  
+2. Overwriting `ip_kobject` of a dangling port.  
+3. Jumping to shellcode mapped at a PAC-forged address using `mprotect()`.
+
+---
+
+## 2024-2025: SIP Bypass through Third-party Kexts – CVE-2024-44243 (aka “Sigma”)
 
+Security researchers from Microsoft showed that the high-privileged daemon `storagekitd` can be coerced to load an **unsigned kernel extension** and thus completely disable **System Integrity Protection (SIP)** on fully patched macOS (prior to 15.2). The attack flow is:
 
+1. Abuse the private entitlement `com.apple.storagekitd.kernel-management` to spawn a helper under attacker control.
+2. The helper calls `IOService::AddPersonalitiesFromKernelModule` with a crafted info-dictionary pointing to a malicious kext bundle.
+3. Because SIP trust checks are performed *after* the kext is staged by `storagekitd`, code executes in ring-0 before validation and SIP can be turned off with `csr_set_allow_all(1)`.
 
+Detection tips:
+```bash
+kmutil showloaded | grep -v com.apple   # list non-Apple kexts
+log stream --style syslog --predicate 'senderImagePath contains "storagekitd"'   # watch for suspicious child procs
+```
+Immediate remediation is to update to macOS Sequoia 15.2 or later.
+
+---
+
+### Quick Enumeration Cheatsheet
+
+```bash
+uname -a                          # Kernel build
+kmutil showloaded                 # List loaded kernel extensions
+kextstat | grep -v com.apple      # Legacy (pre-Catalina) kext list
+sysctl kern.kaslr_enable          # Verify KASLR is ON (should be 1)
+csrutil status                    # Check SIP from RecoveryOS
+spctl --status                    # Confirms Gatekeeper state
+```
+
+---
+
+## Fuzzing & Research Tools
+
+* **Luftrauser** – Mach message fuzzer that targets MIG subsystems (`github.com/preshing/luftrauser`).  
+* **oob-executor** – IPC out-of-bounds primitive generator used in CVE-2024-23225 research.  
+* **kmutil inspect** – Built-in Apple utility (macOS 11+) to statically analyse kexts before loading: `kmutil inspect -b io.kext.bundleID`.
+
+
+
+## References
+
+* Apple. “About the security content of macOS Sonoma 14.4.” https://support.apple.com/en-us/120895  
+* Microsoft Security Blog. “Analyzing CVE-2024-44243, a macOS System Integrity Protection bypass through kernel extensions.” https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/01/13/analyzing-cve-2024-44243-a-macos-system-integrity-protection-bypass-through-kernel-extensions/
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